Teaching Portfolio

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Contents

1 Teaching Statement **2**

2 Course Syllabi **4**
2.1 Pragmatics and Manipulative Speech 4
2.2 Social Categorization and Social Inference 8
2.3 The Philosophy of Saul Kripke 10
2.4 The Philosophy of David Lewis 15
2.5 Philosophy of Mind 18
2.6 The Ethics of Conversation 22

3 Student Evaluations **30**

1 Teaching Statement

Philosophy aims to answer deep and general questions concerning topics that are of central importance to human beings, questions like: What is there and how is it structured? What and how can we know? Is the mind physical? Are there moral truths, and if so, what is their basis? Do we have free will? What is the nature of meaning? What is justice, and how can we achieve it? Of course, this list is not close to exhaustive, and the questions that philosophers ask and address are often much more specific than these, but the aim of answering these kinds of big and important questions is what makes philosophy distinctive.

My aim in teaching philosophy is to provide students with the tools to understand and appreciate the depth of these questions, grasp the variety of answers that have been proposed, and make progress on these questions themselves. Part of the beauty of analytic philosophy is that it has allowed us to formulate many of these questions precisely. But to even grasp these precise formulations, students need a collection of basic analytical tools. For example, to grasp the precise formulation of 'Is the mind physical?', students need to have some understanding of notions like supervenience, grounding, entailment, definition, and reduction. While the tools may vary in each case, analogous points hold concerning all of the questions above.

Providing students with these tools is just a first step. Students also need to be able to critically examine and engage with the various answers to these questions. The paradigm of this kind of examination and engagement consists in the construction and criticism of arguments. My aim as a teacher is to help students recognize and make explicit the structure of the arguments they encounter, cogently criticize them, and craft their own arguments for the views they find most compelling. Thinking of philosophy as a discipline that constructs and analyzes arguments is an ideal that guides both my research and my pedagogy.

Concern with traditional questions by no means diminishes the idea that philosophy can help address pressing social, political, and moral issues. On the contrary, now more than ever, addressing such problems requires just the kinds of analytical tools, precise thinking, and clear argumentation that philosophy, when well-taught, can provide. For example, public discourse is often plagued by imprecision and ambiguity so extreme as to be nearly meaningless. Philosophy can provide students with exactly the tools needed to remedy this ill, among many others. It can help us make precise the language we use and the questions we address in public discourse, help us detect and resist the many forms of manipulative speech we encounter, and so help foster more productive discussion concerning pressing social problems.

I teach courses across core areas of philosophy that put these views of philosophical pedagogy into practice. Most recently I have developed and taught two complementary seminars on the work of figures that are foundational for modern metaphysics and epistemology: Saul Kripke and David Lewis. The class on Kripke, taught at the upper-level undergraduate level, begins with *Naming and Necessity*, discusses traditional issues concerning reference and modality, and goes on to investigate how Kripke's views have been developed into several different—and indeed conflicting—positions on the mind-body problem. The course on Lewis, taught at the graduate level, explores the Lewisian

counterpoints to Kripke's views on many of the same topics while also providing a systematic overview of Lewis's metaphysics and epistemology. I think the course will prove highly useful as a foundational course for graduate students hoping to work in M&E.

I have also taught logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind at the undergraduate and graduate levels. I have taught logic at levels ranging from introductory to advanced mathematical, to students ranging from gifted high-schoolers to PhDs in philosophy at Yale. I've also developed and taught classes devoted to the classical problems and arguments in philosophy of mind and language. In the Spring of 2016, together with Zoltán Gendler Szabó, I designed and taught an interdisciplinary class on the nature of mental and linguistic intentionality; in 2018 I developed and taught the intermediate philosophy of mind course at ANU; and in 2022, together with Simon Prosser, I taught the advanced undergraduate course in philosophy of mind at St. Andrews.

Finally, I have developed and taught three courses that apply the tools of philosophy of language, semantics, and pragmatics to the social world. The first, 'Pragmatics and Manipulative Speech', aims to give students the tools to understand how manipulative speech functions and how it manifests itself in public discourse. The second, 'Social Categorization and Social Inference', developed and taught with Renée Jorgensen, aims to give students an understanding of generic and statistical mechanisms that underlie social categorization. The third, 'The Ethics of Conversation', developed and taught with Justin Snedegar, brings together work in linguistic pragmatics and work in ethics and political philosophy to investigate the norms governing non-ideal speech in democratic societies. You will find syllabi from several of these courses below, and you can find more information about my teaching on my website: `https://justindambrosio.wixsite.com/philosophy`.

University of St Andrews — Department of Philosophy
PY4632 *Contemporary Philosophy of Language: Pragmatics and Manipulative Speech*

Semester 2 2022-23

30 Credits

KEY MODULE INFORMATION

Convenor: Justin D'Ambrosio
Lectures: Lectures: Tuesday 3pm-5pm, YHL Seminar Room 2
Seminars: Seminars: Fridays @ 12pm and 1pm, EDG 104, starting week 2.
Please sign-up for a seminar on MMS from Monday of Week 0

Assessment:

Two essays.

Essay 1, worth 30% of final mark: 1500 words.
Deadline: Thursday 9 March, 2023

Essay 2, worth 70% of final mark: 4000 words.
Deadlines: Monday 24 April 2023

Intended Learning Outcomes: By the end of the module, students should have a grasp of the basic frameworks that philosophers and linguists use for thinking about and modelling conversation. They should also have a basic grasp of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, the distinction between what is said and what is meant, the related idea of implicature, and how context figures into each of these. They should understand what the common ground is and the role it plays in philosophers' and linguists' models of conversation, they should know what the question under discussion is, and how it affects what is said and what is implicated, and they should have a preliminary understanding of the role that cooperativity plays in conversation. They will also have a basic understanding of the various competing views of lying, how lying differs from merely misleading, and of the categories of strategic and manipulative speech more generally.

LECTURE PLAN & READINGS

Readings marked with a * are essential. Readings not marked with * are recommended. Readings are listed roughly in order of importance.

Week 1: Grice and the Standard Model of Conversation

- *H.P. Grice (1975): 'Logic and Conversation';
- *H.P. Grice (1989): 'Further notes on Logic and Conversation';
- *Zoltán Gendler Szabó: 'The Goal of Conversation', Section 1
- H.P. Grice (1957): 'Meaning'
- Wayne Davis: 'Implicature', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Week 2: Context as Common Ground

- *Robert Stalnaker (2002): 'Common Ground'
- *Robert Stalnaker (1998): 'On the Representation of Context'
- Robert Stalnaker: Context, Introduction + Ch.s 1&2 (don't worry too much about the details of chapter 1)
- Robert Stalnaker (1974): 'Pragmatic Presuppositions'

Week 3: Structuring the Common Ground

- *David Lewis (1979): 'Scorekeeping in a Language Game'
- *Anton Benz and Katja Jasinskaja (2017): 'Questions Under Discussion: From Sentence to Discourse'
- Craige Roberts(1996): 'Information structure in discourse; Toward an integrated theory of formal pragmatics', *Semantics & Pragmatics,* Volume 5, Article 6: 1–69,
- Paul Portner: 'The Semantics of Imperatives within a Theory of Clause Types'

Week 4: Illocution and Common Ground

- *J.L. Austin: *How to do things with words*, lectures VIII, IX, X, and XI
- *Bach and Harnish: *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, Chapters 1 and 2.
- Robert Stalnaker: "Assertion"
- Robert Stalnaker: Selections from *Context and Content*
- Anders Schoubye and Andreas Stokke: "What is said?" in *Noûs*

Week 5: Lying and Misleading

- *Andreas Stokke (2018): Lying and Insincerity, Introduction + Chapters 1-3
- *Don Fallis (2009): 'Lying as a Violation of Grice's First Maxim of Quality';
- Jennifer Saul (2012): *Lying, Misleading, and What is Said*, part 1
- Sam Berstler (2019): 'What's the good of language? On the Moral Difference between Lying and Misleading', *Ethics*, 130(1)

Week 6: Lying and Misleading, Continued

- *Andreas Stokke: Lying and Insincerity, Chapters 4 & 5;
- Asher and Lascarides (2013): 'Strategic Conversation';
- Jörg Meibauer (2018): 'Lying, Implicating, Presupposing'
- Jennifer Lackey (2013): 'Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce', *Analysis*, 73(2)

Spring Break

Week 7: Strategic Speech and Manipulative Speech

- *Jennifer Saul (2018): 'Dogwhistles, Political Manipulation, and the Philosophy of Language';
- *Justin Khoo (2017): 'Code Words in Political Discourse'
- Mike Deigan (2021): 'Stupefying', in *Philosopher's Imprint*
- Mary-Kate McGowan: 'Conversational Excitatives'
- Andrew Peet (2018): 'Defective Contexts'

Week 8: Silencing

- *Rae Langton (2009) 'Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts', in Sexual Solipsism. OUP.
- *Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton (1998), 'Free speech and illocution', Legal Theory, 4(1), 21–37.
- Alexander Bird (2002) 'Illocutionary silencing,'in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 83: 1–15.
- Ishani Maitra (2009) 'Silencing speech,', in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 39, pp. 309–38.
- Samia Hesni (2018) 'Illocutionary Frustration', in MIND, vol. 127 (508), pp. 947-976

Week 9: Accommodation and the At-Issue/Not-at-Issue Distinction

- *R. Langton and C. West (1999) 'Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game', in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 (3).
- *Jason Stanley (2015): How Propaganda Works, Princeton University Press, Chapters 3 and 4.
- Rae Langton (2018): Accommodating Injustice: The John Locke Lectures, Oxford University Press
- Rae Langton (2018): 'Blocking as Counterspeech', in New Work on Speech Acts, ed.s D. Fogal, D. Harris, M. Moss.

Week 10: Slogans and Discourse Structure

- *Jessica Keiser (2021): 'The "All Lives Matter" response: QUD-shifting as epistemic injustice', Synthese,
- Jessica Keiser (forthcoming): Non-Ideal Philosophy of Language, Chapters *7, 8, and 9
- Luvell Anderson (2017), 'Hermeneutical Impasses', in Philosophical Topics, 45(2), pp. 1-19
- Myisha Cherry (forthcoming): 'Value-Based Protest Slogans', in The Movement for Black Lives: Philosophical Perspectives

Week 11: Generics and the Common Ground

- *Sarah-Jane Leslie: "The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization", Journal of Philosophy, 114(8), 393-421
- *Jennifer Saul (2017): "Are Generics Especially Pernicious?", Inquiry,
- https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1285995
- Katherine Ritchie (2019): "Should we use Racial and Gender Generics?", Thought 8(1): 33-41
- Anne Bosse (2021): "Generics, some (non-)specifics", Synthese, forthcoming

ADDITIONAL READINGS & RESOURCES

The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, ed. Justin Khoo and Rachel Katherine Sterken

The Oxford Handbook of Pragmatics, ed. Yan Huang

Foundations: Social Categorization and Social Inference

Renee Jorgensen Bolinger
Justin D'Ambrosio
Australian National University

October 27, 2022

Course Description

This is a course on social categorization and the inferences that we can and do draw on the basis of these categorizations. Questions concerning social categorization and inference fall at the intersection of a huge number of areas within philosophy and the social and cognitive sciences. These questions can be approached from within metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, philosophy of language, semantics, ethics, political philosophy, and legal theory, among others. Suffice it to say, we won't be able to cover all of these approaches in a *Foundations* course. Our plan is to introduce you to these problems first through a discussion of *generics*, and then by presenting a related collection of epistemological and ethical issues concerning inferences made on the basis of membership within certain kinds of categories. However, the entire course is oriented around an epistemic goal: when are inferences made on the basis of social categorization rational? But even proposing solutions to our epistemic question will require taking many semantic, cognitive, ethical, and metaphysical detours.

Course Requirements

The only course requirements are that you come to class having read the required readings, and ready to engage in discussion with us and your fellow post-graduate students.

A note about the syllabus: • denotes required reading, while ◦ denotes suggested reading. In one case, we've used both to indicate that we strongly suggest reading part of a paper. Whether required or suggested, the most important readings are listed first. At the end of the syllabus is a list of related readings organized by topic.

Schedule and Readings - SUBJECT TO CHANGE!

1. 17/5 - Generics: Semantics

- • Sarah-Jane Leslie and Adam Lerner: Generic Generalizations, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- • Sarah-Jane Leslie - "Generics: Cognition and Acquisition", *The Philosophical Review*, 117(1):1-47, (2008)
- •◦ Ariel Cohen - "Generics, Frequency Adverbs, and Probability", *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 22(3):221-253, (1999) - we strongly suggest reading sections 1 and 2.
- ◦ Ariel Cohen - "Generics and Mental Representations", *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 27(5):529-556, (2004)
- ◦ David Liebesman - "Simple Generics", *Nôus*, 45(3):409-442, (2011)
- ◦ Rachel Sterken - "Generics in Context", *Philosopher's Imprint*, 15(21), (2015)

2. 24/5 - Generics Continued: Prejudice

- Sally Haslanger - Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground, in Charlotte Witt, *ed.*, *Feminist Metaphysics*, 179-207, (2011)
- Endre Begby - "The Epistemology of Prejudice", *Thought*, 2(1):90-99, (2013)
- ◦ Sally Haslanger - "The Normal, the Natural, and the Good", *Political & Societá*, 365-392, (2014)

3. 31/5 - Generics Continued: Essentialism

- Sarah-Jane Leslie - "The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization", in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 114(8):393-421 (2017)
- Jenny Saul - "Are generics especially pernicious?", *Inquiry*, (2017)
- ◦ Paul Silva - "A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content", *Synthese*, forthcoming.

4. 14/6 - Epistemic Problems with Statistical Inference

- Jessie Munton (ms) - "The Epistemic Flaw with Accurate Statistical Generalizations"
- Colyvan, Regan, and Ferson - "Is it a Crime to belong to a Reference Class?", *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 9(2):168-181, (2001)
- ◦ Laurence Thomas - "Statistical Badness", *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 32(1):30-41
- ◦ Alan Hajek - "The Reference Class Problem is Your Problem, Too", *Synthese*, 156(2):536-585, (2007)
- ◦ Oscar H. Gandy, "Engaging Rational Discrimination", *Ethics and Information Technology*, 12(1):29-42, (2209)

5. 31/5 - Moral Problems with Statistical Inference

- Lara Buchak - *Belief, Credence, and Norms*, *Philosophical Studies*, 169(2):1-27
- Sarah Moss - "Moral Encroachment", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, forthcoming
- ◦ Georgi Gardiner, "Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment", in Kevin McCain (*ed.*), *Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism*], forthcoming

6. 7/6 - The Importance of Statistical Inference

- Risse & Zeckhauser - "Racial Profiling", *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 32(2):131-170, (2004)
- Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - "We are all different: statistical discrimination and the right to be treated as an individual", *The Journal of Ethics*, 15(1/2):47-59, (2011)
- ◦ Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - "Nothing Personal: On Statistical Discrimination", *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 15(4):385-403, (2007)
- ◦ Georgi Gardiner - "Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence", in James Chase and David Coady (*ed.s*), *Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology*, Routledge, forthcoming
- ◦ Barbara D. Underwood - "Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment", 88 *Yale Law Journal* 1408, (1979)

University of St Andrews — Department of Philosophy
PY4617 *The Philosophy of Saul Kripke*

Semester 1 2023-24

30 Credits

MODULE INFORMATION

Lectures: Monday, 2-4pm, Butts Wynd room 10

Seminars:

- Group 1: Thursday 2pm, Butts Wynd room 11.
- Group 2: Thursday 3pm, Butts Wynd room 11.

Seminars begin in week 2. Please sign up for a seminar on MMS at your earliest convenience.

Module convenor and lecturer: Justin D'Ambrosio, jzd1@st-andrews.ac.uk
Office hour: Monday, 4-5pm, Edgecliff B17.

Assessment: 100% coursework

1. Two short analytical essays, 1000 words each, due October 6th and October 27th, respectively, questions to be released 2 weeks prior.
2. One longer final essay, 3000 words, due December 1st.

Module Description: This course concerns the philosophy of Saul Kripke, one of the most influential analytic philosophers of the past 50 years. The course will focus largely on what is considered to be his magnum opus, *Naming and Necessity*, as well as the topics therein. These will include issues concerning the metaphysics of modality, the nature of reference, the relationship between the mind and the body, the nature of kinds, essential and non-essential properties, among many others. The course will also touch on Kripke's famous commentary on Wittgenstein, along with his views on propositional attitudes, the first person perspective, and truth.

LECTURE PLAN & ESSENTIAL READINGS

Main texts:

1. Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (NN) (on Moodle)
2. Saul Kripke, *Philosophical Troubles*, (PT) (on Moodle)

3. Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language* (W)
4. *Saul Kripke*, ed. A. Berger. (SKB)

General background reading:

1. Christopher Hughes, *Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004
2. G.W. Fitch, *Saul Kripke*, Acumen Publishing 2004
3. John Burgess, *Kripke: Key Contemporary Thinkers*, Polity 2013

Fun Introductory Reading. Technically optional, but worth it. This will give you a sense of the historical importance of the lectures you're about the read.

"The Ashtray", by Errol Morris. In the NYT archive:

1. https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/the-ashtray-the-ultimatum-part-1/
2. https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/the-ashtray-shifting-paradigms-part-2/
3. https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/the-ashtray-hippasus-of-metapontum-part-3/
4. https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/the-ashtray-the-author-of-the-quixote-part-4/
5. https://archive.nytimes.com/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/the-ashtray-this-contest-of-interpretation-part-5/

Week 1: Introduction to Modality and Modal Logic

Required Reading: Kripke, Saul, "Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic", *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, 16, 83-94, 1963
https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=KRISCO&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fsaulkripkecenter.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2019%2F03%2FSemantical-Considerations-on-Modal-Logic-PUBLIC.pdf

Recommended/Background Readings:

- James Garson, "Modal logic", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*
- Wolfgang Schwarz, *Logic 2: Modal Logic,* especially chapters 9 and 10. *https://www.umsu.de/logic2/logic2.pdf*
- John Burgess, "Kripke Models", in SKB
- James Garson, "Quantification in Modal Logic", in *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-0454-0_3

Week 2: Naming and Necessity Lecture 1

Required Reading: Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lecture 1

Background Reading:

- Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference" http://www.scu.edu.tw/philos/98class/Peng/05.pdf
- Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting", https://www.jstor.org/stable/2248381
- Robert Stalnaker: "Possible Worlds Semantics: Philosophical Foundations" in SKB

Week 3: Naming and Necessity Lecture 2

Required Reading:

1. Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity,* Lecture 2
2. Saul Kripke, *Identity and Necessity*, In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), *Identity and Individuation*. New York: New York University Press. pp. 135-164 (1971)

Background Reading:

- Bernard Linsky, "Kripke on Proper and General Names", in SKB
- Scott Soames: "Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility", in SKB
- Dilip Ninan, 'Naming and Epistemic Necessity', *Noûs*, 55(2): 334-362

Week 4: Naming and Necessity Lecture 3

Required Reading: Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Lecture 3

Background Reading:

- Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of Meaning"
- Alexander Bird, "Natural Kinds", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/

Week 5: Mind, Body, and *A Posteriori* Physicalism

- **Required Readings:** Sydney Shoemaker, 'Kripke and Cartesianism', in SKB

Background Reading:

- Alex Byrne, 'Imagination and Possibility', *Philosophical Perspectives* 21, 2007
- David Chalmers: "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?"

- Stephen Yablo: “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?” https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/stable/2108052?origin=crossref
- Stephen Yablo, “Concepts and Consciousness”, http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/concon.html

Week 6: No class, independent learning week

Week 7: Propositional attitudes

Required readings: Kripke “A puzzle about belief”, in *PT*

Background Reading:

- M. Richard “Kripke’s puzzle about belief”,
- N. Salmon, “A note on Kripke’s puzzle about belief”
- Tim Crane, “Names, Sense, and Kripke’s Puzzle”, in *From the Logical Point of View* 2: 11-26
- Bryan Frances, “Contradictory Beliefs and Epistemic Closure Principles”, *Mind and Language* 14(2): 203-226, 1999

Week 8: Fiction and nonexistence

Required readings: Kripke “Vacuous names and fictional entities”,

Background Reading:

- N. Salmon “Fiction, myth, and reality”, in SKB
- David Braun, ‘Empty Names’, *Noûs* Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 449-469
- Andrew Bacon, ‘Quantificational Logic and Empty Names’, *Philosopher’s Imprint*, Vol. 13, No. 24, 2013

Week 9: Rule-following and private language

Required readings: Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*

Background Readings:

- Indrek Reiland, “Rule-Following I: The Basic Issues”, in *Philosophy Compass*, forthcoming
- Indrek Reiland, ‘Linguistic Mistakes’, *Erkenntnis*, 88(5), 2191-2206, 2023

Week 10: Rule-following and private language

Required readings: Kripke Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, pt. 2 (excerpts)

Background Reading:

- G. Wilson "On the scepticism about rule-following in Kripke's version of Wittgenstein" in SKB
- Jared Warren 'Killing Kripkenstein's Monster', *Noûs*, 54(2): 257-289, 2020

Week 11: The first person

Required readings: Saul Kripke, "The first person" (in PT)

Background Readings: TBD depending on class interests

ADDITIONAL READINGS & RESOURCES

Philpapers index on Rigid Designation:
https://philpapers.org/browse/rigid-designation

Philpapers index on Kripke's Modal Argument against Dualism:
https://philarchive.org/browse/kripkes-modal-argument-against-materialism

Philpapers index on Kripke's Puzzle about Belief:
https://philarchive.org/browse/kripkes-puzzle-about-belief

Philpapers index on Kripkenstein:
https://philpapers.org/browse/kripkenstein-on-meaning

The Philosophy of David Lewis

Module coordinator and lecturer: Dr. Justin D'Ambrosio
Email: jzd1@st-andrews.ac.uk
Office: Edgecliff B17
Office Hour: Tuesday 1pm

GENERAL INFORMATION

Lectures:

The lectures will provide overviews of the module topics and general background for the assigned readings.

Seminars:

The seminars will consist of group discussions of the assigned readings.

Module content and learning outcomes:

This module will aim to give students a basic understanding of David Lewis's philosophical views in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. The course aims to view Lewis's contributions in a broadly methodological way, by focusing on several big themes in his work and looking at how these themes resurface in a range of areas. The themes we will focus on are (1) Ramsification and functional definition, (2) the doctrine of Humean supervenience, and (3) the doctrine of modal realism.

By the end of the course, students should be familiar how Lewis deploys Ramsification and functional definition in the philosophy of mind and language, and how they are used to locate mentality and language in the fundamental. They should understand his basic view of mental content and the attitudes, and how it builds on his account of the metaphysics of modality. They should understand his account of convention and his idea of the conversational scoreboard, which build on his account of mental states. Finally, they should also understand the basic components of his metaphysics, including the nature of properties, causation, and naturalness, and his basic view of counterfactuals, which figures prominently in many of these issues. We will also touch on his views on chance and knowledge.

ASSESSMENT

Two short papers, 1000 words each, each worth 20% of the total mark.

One long paper, 4000 words, worth 60% of the total mark.

WEEKLY READINGS

Week 1: Humean Supervenience
- Humean Supervenience debugged (1994)
- Introduction to *Philosophical Papers, Vol. II* (1986)
Optional: Brian Weatherson, "Humean Supervenience"

Week 2: Naturalness
- New Work for a Theory of Universals (1983)
-Putnam's Paradox (1984)
Optional: Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride: Lewis's Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism (2020)
Jared Warren: Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist (2023)

Week 3: Modality
- *On the Plurality of Worlds* (1986) (excerpts)
Suggested: Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic (1970)

Week 4: Ramsification and Reduction
- How to define theoretical terms (1970)
- An argument for the identity theory (1966)
Suggested: Naming the Colors (1997)

Week 5: The Nature of Mind
- Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications (1972)
- Mad Pain and Martian Pain (1980)
-Optional: Janet Levin: Analytic Functionalism and the Reduction of Phenomenal States (1991)

Week 6: Attitudes
- Radical Interpretation (1974)
- Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De Se*
-Optional: Frank Jackson and Daniel Stoljar: Understanding Self-Ascription (2020)

Week 6: Counterfactuals
- *Counterfactuals* (1973) (excerpts)
- Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow (1979)

Week 7: Causation
- Causation (1973)
- Causal Explanation (1976)
- Events (1986)
Optional: Causation as Influence (2000)

Week 8: Truth and Truthmaking
- Truthmaking and difference-making (2001)

Week 9: Language
- Languages and Language (1975)
- Scorekeeping in a language game (1979)
-Optional: Jessica Keiser: On Meaning without Use (2021)

Week 10: Knowledge
- Elusive Knowledge (1996)

Week 11: Chance
- A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance (1980)

Resources:

Besides the Main Library, online texts: to find electronic journals and books, search in the library catalog https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/library/ . There are several useful online encyclopedias that can provide you with introductions to topics as well as some technical details. Your most precious tool is the the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/: some of its entries will be mandatory readings for this module (see below). Other useful resources include the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://iep.utm.edu/ and Philosophy Compass https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17479991 .

Research tools:
PhilPapers https://philpapers.org/ and Google Scholar https://scholar.google.co.uk/ can direct you to books, articles, authors, citations of those authors, etc. They provide a good way to find out if a publication has generated discussion in the philosophical literature.

There are a also huge number of resources that can help you learn about Lewis. Perhaps first among them is a bibliography of most of Lewis's works, with links to each listed article:

https://andrewmbailey.com/dkl/

There are also several helpful encyclopedia entries:

"David Lewis's Metaphysics", Ned Hall, Brian Rabern, and Wolfgang Schwarz: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lewis-metaphysics/index.html

"David Lewis", Brian Weatherson: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/#5

PHIL2061: Philosophy of Mind

Semester 2, 2018

Justin D'Ambrosio

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Course Description

This is an introductory course on the Philosophy of Mind. The course will be divided into three sections: (1) metaphysics of the mental, (2) consciousness, and (3) intentionality.

Metaphysics of the Mental This section will cover issues concerning the metaphysics of mental states, such as the following: are mental states identical to physical states? or are they states of a totally different substance? if so, how does this substance interact with the body? Does this distinction rest on a mistake that we can correct by examining how we apply mental terms? Are we confused when we talk about the metaphysics of mind? Are mental states functional states?

Consciousness One major view of what makes the mind distinctive is that it is conscious. This view faces serious objections. But even if this is not the defining feature of the mental, consciousness is still a deeply puzzling feature of mentality. This section will cover several views on the nature of consciousness, along with issues concerning the subjectivity, or "qualitative character" of experience. Is there an irreducibly subjective element to experience? How hard is the problem of consciousness? Do we even know what a theory of consciousness would look like?

Intentionality The other major position on what is distinctive about the mind is that it exhibits intentionality: it represents things. How it comes to represent, though, is not so clear. This section will focus on theories of intentionality. Intentionality is characterized by certain peculiar features, including the ability to represent objects that do not exist. The question of how we manage to represent the non-existent is called the puzzle of non-existence, and it causes problems for other views of how it is that the mind comes to represent.

Course Requirements

Most of our readings will come from the following text:

David Chalmers: *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2002). All of the readings will be posted on Wattle. The readings won't be long, but many may be difficult. You are expected to do them fully and carefully before the class for which they are listed so we can discuss them during class.

10% of your grade will be class participation. The remaining 90% will be based on the following material:

Essay 1: (40%) 2,000 words. Essay questions will be posted on Wattle on 12/08/18.

Essay 2: (50%) 2,500 words. Essay questions will be posted on Wattle on 7/10/18.

Course Structure and Readings

Metaphysics of the Mental

Week 1: Introduction and Dualism

1.1
- Required: Chalmers, David (2002). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, Oxford University Press, USA, (Introduction)
- Further reading: Clark, Andy, Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (Introduction)

1.2
- Required: Dualism - Descartes: Meditations II and IV (in PoM)
- Required: Robinson, Howard (2015). "Dualism" *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*
- Further reading: David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Ch. 1

Week 2: Behaviorism

2.1
- Required: Ryle, Gilbert (1949). "The Concept of Mind." University of Chicago Press. [Extract: "Descartes' Myth"]
- Further reading: "Behaviorism", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*
- Putnam, Hilary (1963). "Brains and Behaviour." in Butler, Ronald (ed.), "Analytical Philosophy: Second Series." Blackwell.

2.2
- Required: Dan Dennett: "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works"
- Further reading: Chomsky, Noam (1959), "A Review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior"

Week 3: The Identity Theory

3.1
- Required: U.T. Place: "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?", in Chalmers (2002)
- Required: J.J.C. Smart: "Sensations and Brain Processes" (included with the above link)
- Further reading: Herbert Feigl: "The Mental and the Physical"
- Further reading: J.J.C. Smart: "The Mind/Brain Identity Theory", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

3.2
- David Lewis: Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications (in PoM)
- Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, excerpts

Week 4: Functionalism

4.1
- Required: Sterelny, Kim (1991). *The Representational Theory of Mind: An Introduction* (1st ed.) Wiley-Blackwell. [Chapter 1 only]
- Further reading: Levin, Janet (2018): "Functionalism", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Further reading: Polger (2008) "Functionalism." Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy

- Further reading: Lycan, W. G. (1981). "Form, function, and feel." The Journal of Philosophy, 2450.

4.2
- Required: Putnam, Hilary (1975). "The Nature of Mental States." in Putnam, H. (ed.) *Philosophical Papers Volume 2 , Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press: 429-440 (originally published as "Psychological Predicates", 1963).
- Further reading: Lewis, David (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain." in Block, N. (ed.) *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I*, Harvard University Press: 216-223

Week 5: Troubles with Functionalism, Eliminativism

5.1
- Required: Block, Ned and Fodor, Jerry: "What Psychological States are Not", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 81, No. 2.
- Further reading: Block, Ned (1978). "Troubles with functionalism." in Savage, C. W. (ed.) *Perception and Cognition*, University of Minnesota Press: 261-325.

5.2
- Required: Churchland, Paul (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes", The Journal of Philosophy 78 (2)

Consciousness

Week 6: Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap

6.1
- Required: Chalmers, David (1996), The Conscious Mind, Ch. 1
- Required: Chalmers, David (1995). "Facing up the problem of consciousness." Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3): 200-219
- Further reading: Seager, William (1995). "Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism." Journal of Consciousness Studies 2-3: 272-88
- Further reading: Nagel, Thomas (1979). "Panpsychism." in Nagel, T. *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge University Press

6.2
- Required: Nagel, T. (1974). "What is It Like to Be a Bat?", in *Philosophical Review* 83: 435-450
- Further reading: Levine, Joseph (1983). "Materialism and Qualia: the Explanatory Gap." Pacific Philosophy Quarterly 64: 354-361
- Levine, Joseph (1993). "On Leaving Out What It Is Like." in Davies, M., & Humphreys, G. W. (eds.) *Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays*, Blackwell: 121-136

Week 7: The Conceivability Argument

7.1
- Required: Chalmers, David (1996), The Conscious Mind, Ch. 3,4
- Further reading: Kirk, Robert (2015). "Zombies." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Further reading: Byrne, Alex (2015). "Inverted Qualia." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

7.2
- Required: Dennett, Daniel (1995). "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies." Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 322326.

- Chalmers, D.J. (2002). "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?" in Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.) *Conceivability and Possibility*, Oxford University Press: 145-200.
- Katalin Balog: Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem (online)

Week 8: The Knowledge Argument

8.1
- Required: Jackson, Frank (1982). "Epiphenomenal qualia." The Philosophical Quarterly 32:127136.
- Further reading: Dennett, Daniel (2006). "What RoboMary Knows." in (eds.) *Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism* 15.

8.2
- Required: Churchland, P. M. (1996). "The rediscovery of light." *The Journal of Philosophy*, 211228.
- Required: Lewis, D. (1990). "What Experience Teaches." In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), *Mind and Cognition*, Blackwell.
- Further reading: Lewis, D. (1995). "Should a materialist believe in Qualia?" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 73(1), 140144.

Intentionality

Week 9: Intentionality and Mental Representation

9.1
- Required: Brentano, Franz: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (in PoM)
- Required: Crane, Tim: "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental" (Online)

9.2
- Required: Jerry Fodor: Propositional Attitudes (PoM)
- Required: Jesse Prinz: Furnishing the Mind

Week 10: Internalism vs. Externalism

10.1
- Required: Hilary Putnam: The Meaning of 'Meaning' (excerpts from PoM)
- Further Reading: Tyler Burge: Individualism and the Mental

10.2
- Required: Gabriel Segal, A Slim Book about Narrow Content (excerpts)
- Required: Tim Crane: "All the Difference in the World", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 41:1-25

Week 11: Semantics for Mental Representations

11.1
- Jerry Fodor: Psychosemantics, Preface and Ch. 1 (Online)
- Dan Dennett: Brain Writing and Mind Reading

11.2
- Ruth Millikan: Biosemantics (excerpts in PoM)

Week 12: The Extended Mind

12.1
- Andy Clark and Dave Chalmers: "The Extended Mind"

12.2
- Derek Parfit: "Reductionism and Personal Identity"

University of St Andrews — Department of Philosophy
PY4664 Ethics of Conversation

Semester 1 2023-24

30 Credits

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Key Module Information 1
General information 2
Assessment 2
Lecture Plan & Essential Readings 3

KEY MODULE INFORMATION

Lectures: Wednesday 11-1**,** Arts Seminar Room 7
Seminars: Beginning in Week 2
Group 1: Th 9-10, Edgecliffe G01
Group 2: Th 10-11, Edgecliffe G01
Group 3: Th 11-12, Edgecliffe G01

Module convenor and lecturer: Dr Justin Snedegar, js280@st-andrews.ac.uk
Office hour: Edgecliffe B11, Wednesday 10-11am

Co-lecturer: Dr Justin D'Ambrosio, jzd1@st-andrews.ac.uk
Office hour: Edgecliff B17, Monday 4-5pm

Assessment: 100% Coursework

1. Three 800 word critical summaries, due in weeks of your choosing, before relevant lecture: 40%
2. 3000 word essay, due by 6 December at 23:59: 60%

GENERAL INFORMATION

Module Description: This module is about ways that conversations about important but difficult issues, especially moral and political ones, can go well or badly. It will touch on topics from social epistemology, the philosophy of language, ethics, moral psychology, moral responsibility, and social and political philosophy. Specific topics may include moral criticism, anger, civility, hypocrisy, polarisation, epistemic injustice, trust, lying, gaslighting, echo chambers, conspiracy theories, Fake News, free speech, no platforming, and others. We'll be thinking about how to understand these ideas, what roles they play in our social and political lives, and what the ethical issues surrounding them may be.

ASSESSMENT

Weighting and components:

- Three 800 word critical summaries, 40% total.
- One 3000 word final essay, 60%.

Critical Summaries:

Word Limit: 800 words each

Deadline: Before lecture in the week on which you are writing, i.e. Wednesday at 10:59am

Task: The critical summaries of 800 words should be based on the assigned reading for the seminar, and should be submitted before the lecture in which those readings will be discussed—i.e., by 10:59am Wednesday of the week for which the reading is assigned. Note that we will discuss the seminar reading in the week for which it is assigned—e.g., the seminar in week 2 will be focused on the required reading for week 2. If you are especially interested in one of the recommended articles and would like to write a critical summary of it instead, you may do so.

You should summarize the main argument of the reading, or at least the part of the main argument on which your critical engagement will focus. You must also critically engage with the material, either by formulating an objection or raising a thoughtful question and thinking about potential answers and their implications for the main argument.

The critical summaries will give you the chance to think about a broad range of topics from the module, but will do so in a way that lets you stay up-to-date and engaged throughout the semester, rather than encouraging you to cram for an exam during the revision period. They will be marked on the standard 20-point scale, though the fact that you haven't yet had a seminar on the topic will be taken into consideration. It is up to you when to write them (any three of weeks 2-11, except the ILW in Week 6), but remember that you must do **three** for the semester. They must include both a brief summary of the reading and,

most importantly, critical comments or questions. A sample critical summary will be provided.

Your final essay may, but need not, build on one of your critical summaries. This gives you the opportunity to work on an idea over multiple stages of development, taking feedback into consideration.

Final Essay:

Word Limit: 3000 words

Deadline: 6 December, 23:59.

Task: The purpose of the final essay is for students to critically reflect on one or more key issues discussed in the class. Students should formulate their own essay question/topic. It may, but need not, build on one of your critical summaries. It would be a good idea to briefly discuss the question or topic you are going to address with one of the lecturers.

LECTURE PLAN & ESSENTIAL READINGS

Readings can be found easily using the information below, through the university library (e.g. via Oxford Scholarship Online) or on JSTOR, www.philpapers.org, etc. DOI links have been provided for many of the readings, as well.

Week 1: What is Conversation?

Main reading: Maxime Lepoutre: *Democratic Speech in Divided Times*, Introduction. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198869757.001.0001

Recommended:

- Paul Grice. 'Logic and conversation'. In *Studies in the Way of Words*, 1989, 22–40.
- Zoltán Gendler Szabó. 'The goal of conversation'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 94 (1):57–86, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaa005
- Robert Stalnaker, 'Common Ground', *Linguistics and Philosophy* 25: 701-721, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020867916902
- Robert Stalnaker, *Inquiry*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1987
- Craige Roberts, 'Information Structure in Discourse: Toward an Integrated Theory of Formal Pragmatics'. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.5.6

Week 2: Norms of Conversation

Main reading: Maxime LePoutre: *Democratic Speech in Divided Times*, Chapter 1, 'Offering Shared Reasons'. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198869757.001.0001

Recommended:

- Jennifer Lackey, 'Norms of Assertion', *Nous*, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00664.x
- Robin Lakoff, 'The Logic of Politeness; or, Minding your Ps and Qs', In C. Corum, T. Cedric Smith-Stark, & A. Weiser (Eds.), Papers from the 9th Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. Chicago Linguistic Society, 292-305. The Logic of Politeness: or, Minding Your P's and Q's: Ingenta Connect
- Anthony Simon Laden, 'Norms of Conversation', *Reasoning: A Social Picture,* Oxford University Press, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606191.001.0001
- Sandford Goldberg, *Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges*, Oxford University Press, 2020 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198856436.001.0001

Week 3: Violating Conversational Norms

Main reading:

- Michael Hannon, 'Public Discourse and its Problems', *Philosophy, Politics, and Economics*, vol. 22(3) 336-356, 2023, symposium on *Democratic Speech in Divided Times*. DOI: 10.1177/1470594X221100578

Recommended:

- Harry Frankfurt, *On Bullshit*, Princeton University Press 2005, *https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7t4wr*
- Andreas Stokke, *Insincerity*, NOÛS 48:3 (2014) 496-520, https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12001
- George Orwell, 'Politics and the English Language'
- Maxime Lepoutre, *Democratic Speech in Divided Times*, Ch.s 3 and 4
- Renee Jorgensen Bolinger, "The Pragmatics of Slurs", *Noûs,* 51(3) 439-462, https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12090
- Justin D'Ambrosio, 'A Theory of Manipulative Speech', manuscript.
- Justin D'Ambrosio, 'Manipulative Underspecification', manuscript

Week 4: Anger

This week examines the role of *anger* in conversation. Standardly, anger is dismissed as a threat to reasoned dialogue, and rational judgment or behaviour in general. The readings for this week argue that anger can, on the contrary, be both apt and productive, in many instances.

Lecture: Amia Srinivasan, "The Aptness of Anger" in *The Journal of Political Philosophy* (2018), Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 123-144. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12130

Recommended:

- Sukaina Hirji, "Outrage and the bounds of empathy", *Philosophers' Imprint* 22, 2022. https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1296

- Maxim Lepoutre, *Democratic Speech in Divided Times*, ch. 3.
- Cheshire Calhoun, "The Virtue of Civility", in *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (2000), Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 251-275. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.00251.x
- Macalester Bell, *Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of Contempt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- Martha Nussbaum, *Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
- Marilyn Frye, "A Note on Anger" in *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory* (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 1983), pp. 84-94.
- William Hazlitt, "On the Pleasure of Hating" (1821) in *The Plain Speaker: The Key Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), ed. Duncan Wu, pp. 102-114.
- Myisha Cherry & Owen Flanagan (eds.) *The Moral Psychology of Anger* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019)

Week 5: Gaslighting

One way abusers, oppressors, and others who destroy the possibility of good faith, productive conversation can coerce their victims into agreeing with them and so doing what they want is by *gaslighting* them—undermining the confidence their victims should have in their own perceptions and evaluations of the world.

Main reading: Sophia Dandelet, "Epistemic coercion", *Ethics*, 131(3): 489-510, 2021. Epistemic Coercion (uchicago.edu)

Recommended:

- Kate Abramson, "Turning up the lights on gaslighting", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 24(1): 1-30, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12046
- Natascha Rietdijk, "Post-truth politics and collective gaslighting", forthcoming in *Episteme*: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.24
- Cynthia Stark, "Gaslighting, misogyny, and psychological oppression", *The Monist*, 102(2): 221-235, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onz007
- Thomas Carson, "Lying, deception, and related concepts", *The Philosophy of Deception*, Martin, ed., Oxford UP, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.003.0010
- Teresa Marqués, "Disagreement with a Bald-Faced Liar", *Ratio*, 33(4), 255-268, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12268

Week 6: Independent Learning Week, No Class

Week 7: Apologizing & Forgiving

We inevitably have to deal with moral *wrongs*, and this leads to some of the most meaningful and contentious conversations we have as we attempt to repair things by going through the process of apology and forgiveness.

Main reading: Jeffrey S. Helmreich, "The Apologetic Stance" in *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (2015), Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 75-108. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12053

Recommended:

- Luc Bovens, "Apologies", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 108 (2008), pp. 219-239. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00244.x
- Margaret Urban Walker, "Forgiveness" in *Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 151-190. https://www-cambridge-org.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/core/books/moral-repair/forgiving/22EFAB71939062EAA58CFC2B69A3383A
- Pamela Hieronymi, 'Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2001), 62(3): 529-555. https://doi.org/10.2307/2653535.
- Lucy Allais, "Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 36(1), 2008, pp. 33-68. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00123.x
- Adrienne M. Martin, "Owning up and Lowering Down: The Power of Apology" in *The Journal of Philosophy* (2010), 107(10): 534-553. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29778053
- Nick Smith, *I Was Wrong: The Meaning of Apologies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- Jeffrie Murphy & Jean Hampton, *Forgiveness and Mercy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
- Linda Radzik, *Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Week 8: When to Keep Quiet

Sometimes, and about some topics, we should *not* engage others in conversation. In what situations is this true, and why?

Main reading: Daniela Dover, "The walk and the talk", *Philosophical Review*, 128(4): 387-422, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7697850

Recommended:

- Linda Radzik, "On the virtue of minding your own business", *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 46(2): 173-182, 2012. s10790-012-9317-1.pdf (springer.com)
- Maggie O'Brien, "Easy for you to say", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1919723
- Cressida Gaukroger, "Privacy and the importance of 'getting away with it'", *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, 17: 416-439, 2020. Privacy and the Importance of 'Getting Away With It' in: Journal of Moral Philosophy Volume 17 Issue 4 (2020) (brill.com)
- Thomas Nagel, "Concealment and exposure", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 27(1): 3-30, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.1998.tb00057.x
- Jessica Isserow & Colin Klein, "Hypocrisy and moral authority", *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 12(2): 191-222, 2017. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i2.224
- K. Fritz & D. Miller, "Hypocrisy and the standing to blame", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 99: 118-139, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12104
- Macalester Bell, "The standing to blame: a critique", in *Blame*, eds. Coates and Tognazzini, Oxford University Press, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.003.0014

- Glenn Loury, "Self-Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of 'Political Correctness' and Related Phenomena, *Rationality and Society*, 6(4), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463194006004002

Week 9: To Platform or Not to Platform?

Much of this module examines the duties of participants in conversation. But what about the duties that third parties (e.g., publishers, universities, social media platforms) might have to stop conversation, and/or speech, altogether? What are the ethics of content moderation or, as it is sometimes called, "No Platforming"?

Main reading: Robert Mark Simpson & Amia Srinivasan, "No Platforming" in *Academic Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), Ch. 11, pp. 187-210. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791508.003.0011

Recommended:

- Jeffrey Howard, "Terror, Hate and the Demands of Counter-Speech" in *British Journal of Political Science* (2021), Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 924-939. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341900053X
- Jeffery Howard, "Extreme speech, democratic deliberation, and social media", in Veliz (ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics*, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.10
- Peters, U., Nottelmann, N. "Weighing the costs: the epistemic dilemma of no-platforming". *Synthese* **199**, 7231–7253 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03111-w
- Barath Ganesh & Jonathan Bright, "Countering Extremists on Social Media: Challenges for Strategic Communication and Content Moderation" in *Policy & Internet* (2020), Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 6-19. 304672745.pdf (core.ac.uk)
- George Sher, "Debate: Taking Offense" in *Journal of Political Philosophy* (2020), Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 332-342. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12228
- Jeremy Waldron, "Debate: Taking Offense: A Reply" in *Journal of Political Philosophy* (2020), Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 343-352. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12229
- Emily McTernan, "Taking Offense: An Emotion Reconsidered" in *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (2021), Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 179-208. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12188
- C. Thi Nguyen, "How Twitter Gamifies Communication" in *Applied Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), ed. Jennifer Lackey, pp. 410-436. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833659.003.0017
- Jonathan Haidt & Greg Lukianoff, "The Coddling of the American Mind" in *The Atlantic,* September 2015 Issue. How Trigger Warnings Are Hurting Mental Health on Campus - The Atlantic

Week 10: Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles

A healthy public discourse, as well as individual epistemic success, evidently involves input from different, often in some sense opposed, sources. A common worry is that many of us are trapped in epistemic bubbles or echo chambers, and so do not receive such input.

Main reading: Alex Worsnip, "The obligation to diversify one's sources: against epistemic partisanship in the consumption of news media", *Media Ethics: Free Speech and the Requirements of Democracy*, Fox and Saunders, eds., Chapter 13, Routledge, 2019.

Recommended:

- C. Thi Nguyen, "Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles", *Episteme*, 17(2): 141-161, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.32
- Neil Levy, "Fake news: rebuilding the epistemic landscape", in Veliz (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics*, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.6
- Elizabeth Anderson, "Epistemic bubbles and authoritarian politics", in *Political Epistemology*, eds. Edenberg and Hannon, pp. 11-30, Oxford, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893338.003.0002
- Regina Rini, "Fake News and partisan epistemology", *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, 27(2): 43-64, 2017. Fake News and Partisan Epistemology - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (georgetown.edu)
- Adam Etinson, "Some myths about ethnocentrism", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 96(2): 209-224, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1343363
- Hi-Phi Nation Podcast, Season 2, episode 10 on Echo Chambers. S2, Episode 10: Chamber of Facts – Hi-Phi Nation (hiphination.org)

Week 11: Conspiracy Theories

Many people are taken in by conspiracy theories, which is (often) bad both for them individually and for public discourse. This week we think about what conspiracy theories are and what is bad about them.

Lecture: Quassim Cassam, *Conspiracy Theories* (New York: Polity Press, 2019), Chs. 1 & 4, pp. 1-31, 92-126.

Recommended:

- Endre Begby, "Evidential Preemption", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 102(3), 515-530, May 2021, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12654
- *Seminar*: Cass Sunstein, "Conspiracy theories", in *Conspiracy Theories & Other Dangerous Ideas*, Simon & Schuster, Chapter 1, 2016.
- Richard Hofstadter, "The Paranoid Style in American Politics", *Harper's*, Nov. 1964, https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics/
- Quassim Cassam, *Conspiracy Theories* (New York: Polity Press, 2019).
- Rachel Fraser, "Epistemic FOMO" in *Cambridge Humanities Review* (), Issue 17: https://cambridgereview.cargo.site/Dr-Rachel-Fraser
- M.R.X. Dentith, "Debunking conspiracy theories", *Synthese* (2020), pp. 1-15.
- Michael Hannon, "Disagreement or badmouthing? The role of expressive discourse in politics", in *Political Epistemology*, eds. Edenberg and Hannon, Oxford, 2021.
- *VIDEO:* Netflix, "Behind the Curve"
- M. Giulia Napolitano, "Conspiracy Theories and Evidential Self-Insulation", in *The Epistemology of Fake News*, ed.s Bernecker, Floweree, Grundmann. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0005

Student Evaluations

Phil 281: Intentionality (Spring 2016, as co-Instructor)

"Justin was a wonderful instructor to have, who obviously put much time into preparing his lectures to ensure his students would understand. Very approachable, and always open for questions and assistance."

"Justin is a cool guy, and although I disagreed with a lot of his intuitions, it's clear he has a talent in philosophy, knew what was going on, and was able to answer questions thoroughly and thoughtfully."

"If, as a thinking thing, you have any interested in thinking about just what sort of thinking thing you are, then take this course. Philosophy of mind is confusing and hard, but I am sure you will come out of this course with at least a different idea of what you are. Also, you would be silly not to take a course with Professor Szabo and/or Justin."

Phil 267: Mathematical Logic (Fall 2015)

"Justin was excellent. He really has the ability to convey abstract, complex things in a concrete, accessible way. And he clearly worked painstakingly to make sure his students were on track with the material– making excellent notes, and making himself available via email and in person. Very dedicated, and very capable! Section explained and expanded on ideas discussed in lecture."

"Justin was great! Very lucid explanations, always willing to help out and chat in office hours. I often came into office hours/section feeling confused and always left with a much better understanding of the material."

"Justin was always very helpful! He did a great job of explaining complex concepts in section. I unfortunately wasn't able to make it to as many sections as I would've liked. (I was often finishing up the problem sets during my section time.) That said, section was worthwhile every time that I was able to make it. I particularly enjoyed Justin's supplements to class's core content (many of which took the form of brief tangents)."

"Justin was an excellent TA; his section classes were amazing and helped greatly with understanding the material. His office hours were also excellent; whenever he was able he was willing to stay after hours to make sure that all of his students' questions were answered. Excellent!"

"Justin was very good. For most of the sections, he had his own handouts [...] and these were very helpful. He was very concerned both about helping students understand

the material and get the right answer– but he was also very careful not to give it away straight off. He did an enormous amount of work (often on his own time) outside of his appointed section and office hours helping students on problem sets, for which I'm very appreciative."

Phil 281: Infinity (Spring 2014)

"I consider myself lucky to have had Justin as a teaching assistant in the past semester. He went the extra two miles in instructing me and was always extremely approachable. I'll give an example. Justin suggested that my writing needed some work if I did want to write some good philosophy papers in the future. We had discussed my academic interests in the past and I took up his offer. So he followed through with this by taking the time to go through every sentence of my next two assignments with him offering suggestions through almost all of them. Justin has made this class a highly educational one–I have gained so much in terms of general writing, logic, how to construct arguments and generally how to be a better philosopher. I am very grateful for his assistance."

"Justin was awesome as well. Really helpful at answering questions (in and out of class), and leads really fun discussion sections. I struggled through some of the material, but with his help I was able to do well"

"Section usually served to revisit concepts discussed in lecture with the goal of resolving difficulties students had encountered in the reading/lecture. Our TA, Justin, has a keenly analytic and critical mind and is a very good teacher. He was extraordinarily helpful and always willing to meet with us outside of class."

"Justin really offered helpful comments on all written assignments (he balanced the critical and the supportive well), and he really enhanced the material covered in lectures. I was impressed!"

"I thought that section worked out quite well in this class. It gave us opportunities to more thoroughly discuss the topics of each week. Justin was also very knowledgeable and helped direct us towards supplementary materials relevant to what we discussed."

Phil 204: Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (Fall 2013)

"Justin was great! He went to tremendous lengths to make sure we actually understood everything; sections were a huge part of why I was able to keep up with this class, and he was really helpful in office hours as well. I also appreciated that he was approachable and understanding of the difficulty of this class."

"Justin was a great TA. He was extremely knowledgeable, articulate, and responsive to

questions."

"Justin is an amazing TA! Really accessible and helpful, and really well-versed with the Critique."